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10.1 Introduction
Employee councils in Poland progressively wrested from the Communist
state the juridical rights to hire and fire managers; to control wages, profits,
and investments; and to veto decisions over the sale, transfer, or privatization
of their firms' assets. Paradoxically however, when Communism finally col-
lapsed and the juridical rights of the councils became fully realizable in prac-
tice, many of the people who had earlier fought for them turned against them.
This essay examines the history of the struggle to create works councils under
Communism as well as the more recent attempts by the post-Communist state
to radically reduce or eliminate their powers.
The first section traces how paternalistic councils evolved under Commu-
nism into the co-owners of state industry. We argue that as in other countries
the development of councils in Poland can only be understood within the dual
context of social pressures for greater shop floor democracy and economic
pressures for greater flexibility at the point of production. In Poland, however,
these generic pressures were intensified and transformed by the hypertrophized
Taylorism of the Communist project, and by the often brutal attempt to orga-
nize the polity as if it were a single centrally planned organism. The economic
and political difficulties that this project encountered meant that periodically
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elements within the Party promoted the creation of councils either as a way to
legitimate Communist power on the shop floor or to improve the flexibility of
the economy as a whole. At the same time, when workers or others sought to
use the councils as vehicles of either industrial democracy or enterprise auton-
omy, they were immediately repressed for posing fundamental challenges to
the Party's control over the social division of labor.
Over time, this cycle of invention and repression turned the councils into
one of the principal institutional locations of a larger struggle between the state
and society. On both sides of this struggle the economic and political rationales
for supporting plant-based forms of worker representation became so inter-
twined that by the mid-1980s they were inseparable. Paradoxically, this fusion
of economic and political rationales meant that when Communism finally col-
lapsed in Poland, the same reformers who had earlier fought for the councils
now abandoned them: once the councils had fulfilled their political role in
helping to destroy the old regime, all ideas about their past or future economic
significance were forgotten.
The second part of the essay examines the current nature of Polish labor
relations and the ebb and flow of the state's struggle against the councils. We
argue that post-Communist reformers have understood the challenge of sys-
temic transformation in terms of creating "normal" economic institutions in
which labor and capital have clearly defined and distinct social roles. This vi-
sion of normality has helped turn the government's privatization programs and
its efforts to improve the structure and performance of state enterprises into
frontal attacks on plant-based forms of worker representation. These attacks
not only fly in the face of the successful patterns of post-Fordist industrial
relations that seem to be emerging elsewhere, but have proved counterproduc-
tive. Worse, they have helped squander the knowledge, experience, and organi-
zational capacities embedded in the councils and thus weakened one of the
few institutions that might have served as a bridge between the nation's past
and its future.
The third and concluding part of the essay situates the history of Polish
works councils in a larger comparative framework and briefly speculates about
their future development.
10.2 Polish Works Councils in, under, and against Communism
The cumulative effects of World War II destroyed prewar patterns of indus-
trial governance in Poland. The Nazi extermination of the Jews, their almost
equally genocidal policies against the Polish upper classes, and Yalta's move-
ment of Poland's borders 100 miles west left the vast majority of Polish enter-
prises without owners and managers (Golebowski 1965, 12-22). As the Ger-
man army retreated, spontaneously created "factory committees" (komitety
fabryczne) or "plant councils" (rady zakladowe) took control of most enter-
prises, tracking down dismantled machinery, repairing factories, and restarting285 Poland: Councils under Communism and Neoliberalism
production. The councils were generally organized by skilled workers or
white-collar employees and depended on high degrees of worker initiative
and cooperation.
1
Initially, the Communist-dominated Government of National Liberation
supported the formation of the councils and accorded them wide competen-
cies, including the power to name managing directors. In part, the Communists
supported the councils because they feared that without them, control of the
shop floor would pass either to the socialist-dominated trade unions or to for-
mer owners. Most important, however, the Communists realized that for the
moment there was little practical alternative. Between January 1944 and the
spring of 1945, the councils were the dominant force within enterprises.
2
In May 1945, however, the newly established government began to exert its
authority. The Ministry of Industry declared that it had the right to hire and
fire managing directors and that managers, while they had to consult with the
councils, were responsible for firm policy. The trade unions were given control
over nominations to the councils, and a set of branch-based "operational
groups" were empowered to establish production profiles and output targets
for important firms. For the Communists, union control over the councils and
state control over production profiles and output targets marked the beginning
of their Leninist socioeconomic project: politically, all forms of labor represen-
tation were to be transformed into "transmission belts" of the Party, and eco-
nomically, a single, unified state apparatus was to control the production and
exchange of all goods (Kloc 1992, 41-49; Zukowski 1987, 26-39).
Within the postwar state the two "junior" partners of the governing coali-
tion—the Polish Socialist party and the Polish Peasant party—struggled to
maintain their practical and ideological independence from the Soviet-backed
Polish Workers party. Both sought to distinguish themselves from the Commu-
nists by advocating a three-sector economy in which private property would
exist alongside state and cooperative industries. And both stressed that the so-
cialization of the means of production represented a higher form of human
development than mere nationalization. Nonetheless, and despite their empha-
sis on socialization of productive relations, neither party made a concerted
effort to defend the councils (Kloc 1992, 49-60). This political failure, while
unlikely to have radically altered subsequent events (Malara and Key 1952;
Coutouvidis and Reynolds 1986; Polonsky and Drukier 1980) is worth consid-
1. The best general account of the council movement in Poland through 1981 is Kloc (1992).
For the immediate postwar period, see pp. 16-40. See also Zukowski (1987, 12-35). In general,
Kloc tends to stress the worker origins of the councils, while Zukowski stresses their instrumental
political invention.
2. For the early differences within the Polish Communist party and between Moscow and War-
saw over economic issues, including the councils, see Polonsky and Drukier (1980, 73-85). On
the relationship of the councils to the struggle between the Socialist and Communist parties, see
Coutouvidis and Reynolds (1986, 176-90). See also Kloc (1992, 20-43) and Zukowski (1987,
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ering because it highlights the principal forces that later converged to regener-
ate the council movement.
Despite the insistence of the Socialist and Peasant parties on a three-sector
economy, and their high regard for cooperative industry, both recognized a
large role for the state sector and placed great hopes in economic planning.
For the Socialists in particular, the issue was not over planning per se, but
over how to insure that plans were democratically formulated. The party thus
proposed the creation of a third house of Parliament devoted solely to the con-
struction of national plans and together with the Peasant party proposed that
"socialized boards of directors" be interposed between firms and the planning
apparatus to reduce the dangers of bureaucratization. These boards were to be
composed of state, union, and consumers' representatives and were to name
factory directors (Jedruszczak 1983, 5-75; Golebowski 1965, 24-47; Kowalik
1984, 5-55; Korbonski 1965, 20-49).
But although the Peasant and Socialist parties worried about nondemocratic
planning and about the bureaucratic control of firms, they were less interested
in direct participation of workers in the management of enterprises. Some of
this ambivalence toward worker (co-)management was the result of Socialist
strength within the trade union movement, and many saw the Communists'
initial support for the councils as part of a larger attempt to monopolize power.
Indeed, in late 1944, the Socialists agreed to centralize the administration of
the unions, hoping that this would allow them to use their power more effec-
tively. As it turned out, centralization only made it easier for the Communists to
transform the unions into transmission belts of the Party (Kloc 1992, 119-59,
Zukowski 1987, 26-40).
More important, the Socialists' ambiguous attitude toward the councils re-
flected their own lack of clarity about the exact relationship between planning
and the socialization of the means of production. If the state was going to plan
production for the nation as a whole or for key sectors of the economy, it would
have to be able to tell firms what to produce and in what quantity. If so, then it
was not clear what the boundaries of enterprise autonomy, let alone worker
control, could or should be. If, on the other hand, workers or enterprises were
to define the basic parameters of their performance, it was not clear what the
content of economic planning really was. As the Soviet economist Kritsman
put it, "For an economy to be anarchic it is sufficient for there to be a multiplic-
ity of (independent) subjects" (Ellman 1979, 79).
Between 1944 and 1949, the Socialists' faith in planning—doubts notwith-
standing—won out in practice over their continued ideological emphasis on
the virtues of socializing the means of production. Indeed, despite their re-
peated conflicts with the Communists over the construction of plans, they sup-
ported the state's effort to expand its administrative control over enterprises.
Thus, leading Socialists such as Oskar Lange, Michal Kalecki, and Czeslaw
Bobrowski backed on economic grounds the reduction of the councils' powers,
the state's right to name factory managers, the widening of managerial compe-287 Poland: Councils under Communism and Neoliberalism
tencies, and most important, the development of a unified system of economic
administration.
3
Ideological and practical debates between the Socialist and Communist par-
ties, and within them, became moot in 1949, when Moscow began to openly
dictate Polish policy. The Socialists were forced officially to join with the
Communists to create the Polish United Workers party, and the Communist
movement itself was purged of its nationalist leadership. The three-sector
model, already under siege, was officially discarded, and forced collectiviza-
tion began. The State Planning Commission was given absolute authority to
construct comprehensive national plans which were to be implemented
through a (theoretically) unified chain of command. State planners formulated
aggregate material flows and financial balances for the entire economy. These
balances were then broken down on a sectoral basis and distributed to some
20 branch ministries. The ministries in turn drew up targets for the 200-odd
"central administrations" that directly supervised firms. The central adminis-
trations determined production targets, investment funds, wage norms, and
prices for firms. They also named managing directors (drawn from Party lists)
and assigned firms their suppliers and buyers (Brus 1986,3-40; Najduchowska
1964, 79-103).
Within firms, union and council jobs became subject to Party approval, and
the managerial, consultative, and wage-setting roles of organized labor disap-
peared. The principal task of unions and councils became enforcing labor dis-
cipline and promoting socialist work competitions. At least partially to facili-
tate the fulfillment of these functions, the unions were given control over
shortage commodities and allowed to determine access to training programs,
health facilities, vacation spots, and most important, housing. In return for
maintaining shop floor discipline the workforce was promised a share of the
expanding economic pie (Kloc 1992, 164-204; Zukowski 1987, 35-54). These
promises were not honored. While production skyrocketed, living conditions
stagnated during the early 1950s. Communist trade unionism became a parody
of its Western, Fordist counterpart.
As elsewhere, the Polish Communists believed that economic growth pri-
marily depended on the production of producer goods. Thus, they directed
investment to heavy industry at the expense of light industry and set the prices
of producer goods low relative to those of consumer goods. This price policy
insured a bigger bang for every zloty invested in heavy industry, while simulta-
3. On the ambiguous attitudes of leading Socialists toward central planning and its relationship
to workers' councils, enterprise control, and "decentralization," see Bobrowski (1983, 145-90).
Bobrowski was director of Poland's first Planning Bureau and the number-two man in the state
economic administration in the immediate postwar years. His good working relationship with Hil-
lary Mine, the economic tsar of Polish Stalinism—and an excellent planner—is particularly inter-
esting. See also Drenowski (1976, 9-45), Kalecki (1982, 100-105), Osiatynski (1982), and Ko-
walik (1987, 1988). For an excellent treatment of the "decentralization—market socialism"
problem, that focuses on Oscar Lange, see Lavoie (1985).288 Michal Federowicz and Anthony Levitas
neously creating a system of forced savings for consumers. During the early
1950s, forced savings and low wages made it possible for the state to use more
than 30 percent of the GDP for investment purposes. Extraordinarily high in-
vestment levels in turn generated extremely high growth rates as surplus ag-
ricultural labor was mobilized for industrial purposes. At the same time, rap-
idly expanding industrial employment, stable prices, and low levels of
consumer goods production generated the chronic shortages associated with
repressed inflation (Landau and Tomaszewski 1985; Bras 1986; Muller 1985).
The shortages produced by excessive and sectorally skewed investment rates
were further compounded by the structure of the planning system. The (theo-
retical) unification of the economic apparatus, and the attempt to internalize
all transactions within the state, meant that planners were never sure whether
the failure of firms to perform as expected was the product of bad plans, the
internal operation of firms themselves, or the failure of suppliers to provide the
enterprises in question with the needed inputs. Unable to assess firm perfor-
mance and constantly afraid of shirking, the state set taut plans in an effort to
force enterprises to make maximum use of their resources. Firms, in turn, de-
fended themselves against high plan targets by hoarding labor and materials
and by understating their productive possibilities (Kornai 1985; Berliner
1956). Macroeconomically, this vicious circle manifested itself in constant
shortages of basic goods. Microeconomically, it entailed the sweating of work-
ers by the trade unions who supposedly represented them and the constant
replacement of managers by a state that assumed their malfeasance.
In 1956, spurred by the succession crisis in Moscow following Stalin's death
and by social unrest at home, the already embattled regime began a public
discussion of economic reform. In May, the Party convened the Second Con-
gress of Polish Economists. For the first time in seven years the relationship of
planning to the "laws of supply and demand" and to enterprise autonomy were
publicly debated. Despite sharp disagreements over "decentralization" and the
use of market forces in planning, almost all the economists involved in
the debate understood the issue of enterprise autonomy as being distinct from
the question of industrial democracy (Montias 1962, 253-307).
In June, however, workers of the prestigious Cegielski Works changed the
terms of the debate by taking to the streets to protest stagnating living stan-
dards and the Party's dictatorial control of the shop floor. The violent suppres-
sion of these demonstrations radicalized workers elsewhere. But instead of
engaging in street demonstrations, workers began to organize themselves into
independent factory committees. At the FSO Car plant in Warsaw, insurgent
party activists demanded that democratically elected workers' councils (rady
robotnicze) be made responsible for the administration of firms. Their demands
were picked up by regionally based Party reformers and by reform economists.
Both groups now began to connect economic decentralization and the marketi-
zation of planning with industrial democracy (Kloc 1992, 131-49; Zukowski
1987, 54-69).289 Poland: Councils under Communism and Neoliberalism
By the fall, workers' councils had emerged in important coal mines, ship-
yards, steel works, and textile mills. Now, however the councils were often
formed without the help of local Party activists. Indeed, increasingly they arose
despite Party and trade union efforts to suppress them. Sensing the threat posed
by the councils, the Party leadership moved to contain the spontaneous seizure
of factories by promising plant-based forms of worker representation and other
reforms. Talk and half-measures, however, failed to stem the tide of social pro-
test, and in October 1956 the Stalinist leadership of the Party was ousted. Wla-
dyslaw Gomulka, head of the Party's erstwhile nationalist faction, was returned
to power from prison. Boldly defying the Soviets, and hoping to satisfy de-
mands at home, Gomulka declared that the country would now embark on a
"Polish Road to Socialism."
In a series of hastily prepared decrees the new leadership called for the cre-
ation of workers' councils in all state enterprises. The councils were given the
right to veto personnel decisions made by the state and to review firms' annual
plan targets. Enterprises were allowed to retain a small percentage of their
"profits"
4 in newly created "plant funds" (fundusze zakladowy), and the coun-
cils were given control over them in order to pay bonuses and to make small
social investments. At the same time, the Party reduced the number of plan
targets from 20 to 8 and modestly expanded the juridical autonomy of enter-
prises. Seventeen councils were granted extraordinary powers on an experi-
mental basis so that the workable boundaries of decentralization could be
tested. Finally, a wide range of other reforms were promised (Lipinski 1957;
Sturmthal 1964, 119-40).
While the Party discussed reform, workers took matters into their own
hands. Before electoral procedures for the councils could be specified, workers
elected them on their own. By May 1957, the vast majority of the 3,300 coun-
cils that had emerged had been spontaneously created. Throughout the spring
they hired and fired managers without the approval of the state and developed
their own competitive tests to screen applicants. They also reorganized the
administrative structure of firms, modified production profiles, introduced bo-
nus systems, and altered supply networks. Most important, they demanded that
they be recognized as the "sole authority within firms," and that the central
administrations be liquidated and replaced by democratically elected branch
councils. Indeed, despite the firing of managers, the councils' attack on the
central administrations won them the support of many factory managers fed
up with the state's intervention into their daily operations. Harking back to the
earlier ideas of the Socialist party, council activists called for the creation of a
third house of Parliament to construct plans and to coordinate the economic
activities of firms at the national level (Kloc 1992, 148-77; Lipinski 1957,
3-44; Sturmthal 1964, 126-37).
Like the Socialists before them, however, even radical supporters of the
4. It is worth noting that it was completely unclear what the concept of profit meant in practice.290 Michal Federowicz and Anthony Levitas
councils did not reject the framework of central planning and continued to
recognize the state's right to determine prices, investments, major material
flows, and basic wage rates. Thus, despite the desire of council activists and
economic reformers to replace the central administrations with democratically
elected branch councils, neither had a clear answer to the question of how firm
autonomy was to be squared with central planning. Indeed, while reformers
wanted firms to have greater control over wages and prices, and to extend the
role of the market, they feared the inflationary effects of independent wage
setting and rejected a system "of spontaneous price-formation beyond the con-
trol or influence of the state."
5 Moreover, in practice, while the councils were
in constant conflict with the state's economic apparatus over the boundaries of
their own autonomy—wanting to sell to whomever they pleased at prices of
their own choosing—they frequently turned to these same organs to insure
that other firms supplied inputs according to plan (Lipinski 1957, 3-44; Kloc
1992, 149-69).
Ultimately, however, it was not the theoretical or practical shortcomings of
the councils that undid them. Instead, the Party quickly came to see them as
a profound political threat, denouncing the movement's "anarchosyndicalist
tendencies" and warning that "group property" could only lead to the rebirth
of capitalism.
6 In the spring of 1957, the Party reasserted control of managerial
appointments and made efforts to insure that state economic decisions were
binding. Somewhat later, the unions were given control over the electoral lists
to the councils, and in 1958 a new institution, the "conference of worker's self-
management" (konferencja samorzadu robotnicego—KSR) was created. The
KSRs formally assumed the remaining powers of the councils and were run by
a troika composed of the factory director, the head of the plant Party organiza-
tion, and the chief union steward. With their creation, plant-based forms of
labor representation returned to the paternalistic patterns of the past.
Between 1958 and 1970, the economic system changed little. The Party,
however, had learned to set less ambitious investment targets and to devote
greater resources to the production of consumer durables so as to avoid the
radical imbalances of the Stalinist years. But plan modesty did not end the
cycle of hoarding, shortages, and bureaucratic intervention that came with the
system as a whole. Indeed, as the productivity gains made possible by placing
surplus agricultural labor into brick lines dried up and investment rates
dropped, the growth rate steadily declined.
7
In 1967, the Party attempted to reverse this trend by launching a program of
5. Quoted in Sturmthal (1964, 129). See Montias (1962, 263-307) for a fuller discussion of the
price problem, as well as the works cited in n. 11, particularly those relating to Michal Kalecki
and his work.
6. For a classic statement of this position, see Mine (1967).
7. On the political economy of the 1960s and Gomulka's strategy of selective development, see
Brus (1986, 71-139), Landau and Tomaszewski (1985, 246-83), and Jezierski and Petz (1988,
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"selective development." "Archaic" industries were to be phased out and re-
placed by more "modern" ones, with the cost of the shift being paid for through
increased labor discipline and higher consumer prices. In 1968, the govern-
ment began cutting the wages of skilled workers and scaling back certain in-
dustries, among them shipbuilding. In December 1970, when the Party an-
nounced consumer price hikes, workers on the coast took to the streets. As in
1956, they were fired on by the military as they marched toward the Party
headquarters. And as before, state violence did not immediately end resistance.
But unlike in 1956, workers demanded not workers councils but the creation
of an independent union: having seen their efforts to transform the regime
through plant-based institutions undermined, workers now sought to link
themselves in an organization that extended beyond the boundaries of individ-
ual enterprises.
8
The Party tried to preempt these demands by ousting Gomulka and institut-
ing an economic program that used large amounts of Western credit to simulta-
neously raise wages, consumption, and investment. For four years the economy
boomed. By 1976, however, increasing shortages, massive financial imbal-
ances, and a skyrocketing foreign debt forced the state to once again raise
consumer prices (Landau and Tomaszewski 1985, 274-307; Muller 1988). The
ensuing strikes were suppressed, but amazingly the investment boom contin-
ued almost through the end of the decade, forcing a repeat of the now well-
scripted scenario in August of 1980. This time, however, and after 10 years of
organizational struggle, workers forced the regime to recognize the indepen-
dent trade union "NZZ Solidarnosc."
The emergence of Solidarity reopened the question of plant-based forms of
worker representation. Paradoxically, however, it was the Party that first placed
the issue on the table. For hard-liners, councils seemed to provide a way to
split the labor movement. For reformers, they offered the promise of both re-
placing the disintegrating central planning system with some other way of co-
ordinating the economy and trading a modicum of shop floor control for the
social support necessary to undertake austerity measures.
Solidarity was initially unenthusiastic about the Party's offer to revive the
councils and its attempt to involve the union in assuming some of the political
burdens of austerity. During the first eight months of its existence, the union
limited its economic proposals to demanding the redirection of expenditures
from heavy industry and the military to consumer durables and social pro-
grams. Indeed, the union explicitly declined a more direct role in the formation
of economic policy, repeatedly declaring, "we do not want to govern, we just
want to control."
By the spring of 1981, however, the union's position on both economic re-
form and the councils began to shift. At the national level, the country's geopo-
8. For the origins of the demand for independent trade unions and its relationship to the history
of the councils' defeat, see in particular Laba (1986) and Goodwyn (1991, 102-35).292 Michal Federowicz and Anthony Levitas
litical situation left the union's leadership painfully aware that it could not pur-
sue a reform strategy based on free elections. Thus, the national leadership was
faced with the choice of entering into a coalition with a Party it could not trust
or of finding a way to alter the structure of social power without openly calling
into question the basic principle of one-party rule. Not surprisingly, the move-
ment preferred the latter strategy, and its leaders began to talk in terms of creat-
ing a self-managed civil society that would progressively wrest "social space"
from the state, but without directly challenging the Party's political monopoly
(Michnik 1985, 133-55; Ost 1990).
At the local level, workers discovered that while the union increased their
bargaining powers, the strike remained their only real weapon to change shop
floor relations. With time, activists, exhausted by strikes, transformed the fac-
tory committees of the union into permanent negotiating bodies. These com-
mittees tried to throw out managers and to define procedural rules and jurisdic-
tional competencies so that shop floor disputes did not inevitably end in strike
threats. This de facto creation of works councils was, in turn, quietly supported
by the union's national leadership, which felt increasingly vulnerable to the
Party's accusations that constant strikes were destroying the economy (Jaku-
bowicz 1989b; Lewandowski and Szomburg 1984; Norr 1984; Kloc 1992,
178-222; Zukowski 1987, 174-97).
Finally, the union realized that simply redirecting budgetary flows would not
solve the country's economic problems. As in 1956, reform economists argued
for the decentralization of economic decision making and for increasing the
role of the market. Their demands, however, were more radical than before,
calling for dismantling the entire planning apparatus and the creation of auton-
omous, self-managing, and self-financing firms. Firms were to be free to
choose their own suppliers and buyers, set most of their own prices, make
many of their own investments, and choose their own managers. In turn, the
state's planning capacities were to be reduced to controlling interest rates, mak-
ing key investments, and setting the prices of basic goods. By the summer
of 1981, these economists had entered into an alliance with the union's most
developed factory committees to form a network of 17 large enterprises lo-
cated in each of the nation's major administrative districts. This network, or
Siec, promoted the councils within the national union and aided other factories
in forming their own councils.
9
As the movement grew, the national union's position on works councils
changed. Politically, the councils seemed to allow the union to wage war on
the nomenklatura system of industrial appointments while leaving the principle
9. On the mix of economic and political motives behind the formation of Siec, see Chodorowski
(1991) and Balcerowicz (1980). By the fall of 1981, and prior to the legislation that eventually
mandated the creation of the councils, some several hundred had already emerged spontaneously.
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of one-party rule unchallenged at the national level. Organizationally, they
promised a way to institutionalize local conflicts, thus relieving the union of
having to call strike alerts over every dispute. And economically, they gave the
union a positive program that seemed to fall within the politically permissible
parameters of the system as a whole.
In September 1981, the Sejm passed legislation changing the law on state
enterprises and mandating the creation of employee councils (rady pracow-
nicze) in all state firms. The legislation was an uneasy compromise between
the union and the government. Both sides came to the negotiating table mixing
political and economic rationales. Party hard-liners saw councils as a way to
split the labor movement, while many unionists hoped to use them to destroy
the Party's control of managerial appointments. Not surprisingly, the most con-
tentious issue was over how much power the councils would have over manage-
rial selection. Nonetheless, both within the union and the Party people sup-
ported the councils because they thought the councils could serve as the
foundation for a profound economic reform. Indeed, without these voices it is
inconceivable that the final legislation would have been passed.
The new legislation empowered democratically elected employee councils
to fire managers and to veto hiring decisions made by the ministries. The coun-
cils were made the ultimate authority within firms, and the middle levels of
the state's economic apparatus were to be abolished. Council approval became
necessary for all the strategic decisions of the firm, and councils were given
the right to review enterprise documents and contracts. Firms were to retain
after-tax financial earnings, make their own investment and wage decisions,
and choose their buyers and suppliers. Some price- and wage-setting powers
were to be retained by the state, and the state reserved the right to reduce the
powers of the councils in a limited number of "strategically important" firms.
The size of the councils was to be determined by the firms themselves, and
councils were to be directly elected by the workforce every two years. Each
council named a smaller presidium whose president could not hold union or
Party positions (Ustawa 1981a, 1981b).
In December 1981, two months after the passage of the legislation, martial
law was declared and both Solidarity and the about 3,000 existing councils
were suspended. In the spring of 1982, however, the councils were allowed to
resume work, though the law on self-management was amended to give the
state greater discretionary powers (Ustawa 1983). At first, the clandestine lead-
ership of Solidarity argued against participation in the councils, believing—
like Party hard-liners—that the councils would split the labor movement. In-
stead, the underground tried to organize a general strike to relegalize the union.
As the prospect of a general strike receded, and after the regime reinvented, in
1983, the official unions that had collapsed with the birth of Solidarity, the
underground's position on the councils softened. Without ever officially sanc-
tioning participation, local activists were left to do what they thought best.294 Michal Federowicz and Anthony Levitas
Increasingly, they ran for office in council elections arguing for what was
called "the Spanish road" to industrial reform.
1
0
Contrary to the councils elected in 1981, many of those that emerged in
1983 and 1984 were created without the real interest of workers and were in
practice controlled by management. By 1985, however, in the second round of
statutorily required elections, more and more firms followed the legal rules. In
1986, 6,400 of the country's 9,000 state firms had enterprise councils, while
another 5,600 councils functioned at the plant or divisional level.
1
1 In most of
these firms the councils acted as institutional substitutes for the outlawed
union, focusing on wages and working conditions and on limiting the official
union's abuse of their control over social services (Gesicka 1989). In a small,
but extremely active group of firms, including many large and important enter-
prises, the councils attempted to exercise the full range of their managerial
powers. As in 1956, they demanded the right to organize themselves across
firms and actually held two national conferences before the Party stepped in.
Throughout the 1980s, the most active wing of the council movement at-
tempted to extend the self-management system to the entire economy. These
efforts failed, but they helped prevent the reassertion of centralized economic
power. Stronger internal resistance and weaker external control pushed and
pulled firms toward a vaguely defined autonomy that was periodically violated
by the haphazard interventions of the center. Sometimes independence was
achieved as workers and managers joined to keep firms within the self-
management system. And sometimes firms increased their effective autonomy
by agreeing to become "strategic enterprises" but demanding from the state
investment funds or other privileges. In many firms, the councils became the
arena for personal power struggles between different factions of management,
and in most, their activities were limited to controlling pay schemes, dividing
year-end "profits," and regulating the disposition of social funds. Indeed, over
the course of the decade, council activists were often drawn into the political
intrigues necessary to win resources for their enterprises and frequently came
to adopt a managerial view of firm survival. This both eroded the link between
the councils and the workforce and embedded the councils in the traditional
power structure of the enterprise.
Nonetheless, relations between firms were more and more left to the firms
themselves, while managers increasingly faced the workforce without the
strong support of the Party. Rising shop floor pressure and declining central
control intensified collusion between labor and management over wages, push-
ing up inflation and increasing shortages. Inflation rose only in part because
the state was printing money. In addition, firms effectively printed money
10. For the history of the employee councils during the 1980s and their (ambiguous) relations to
the underground union, see Jakubowicz (1989a) and Osiatynski, Pankow, and Federowicz (1985).
11. In all, some six million workers were employed in firms with councils. Fifty-four percent of
council members were blue-collar workers, 27 percent economists, engineers, and technicians,
and 19 percent line managers (Ruszkowski 1985).295 Poland: Councils under Communism and Neoliberalism
themselves by buying from each other on credit and deferring payment.
1
2
As the situation deteriorated, the Party tried to jump start the economy by
opening up the property regime.
1
3
Firms under new property forms used their privileged regulatory status to
raise wages and prices, further accelerating inflation. Experimentation with
property rights increased the incidence of outright theft of state assets by gov-
ernment officials. By late 1988, this "propertization of the nomenklatura" had
become a politically explosive issue.
1
4 In August 1988, workers once again
went on strike demanding pay increases and the relegalization of Solidarity. As
talks with the state began in early 1989, the union's factory committees re-
emerged, in turn often forcing new elections to the employee councils. More-
over, many previously dormant councils now began to exercise their legal pre-
rogatives in an effort to combat the managerial appropriation of state assets. In
June, partly free national elections were swept by candidates nominated by
Solidarity's national Citizen's Committee. Finally, in August 1989, after two
months of parliamentary crisis, Solidarity was invited to form a government.
10.3 Employee Councils in, under, and in the Face of Post-Communist
Neoliberalism
But the Solidarity that formed the government no longer was—if it ever
was—simply a union. Nor was it a labor party. Solidarity's political structure
was a loose coalition of deeply divided elites. Their divisions, however, had
more to do with past tactical differences than with clearly articulated visions
of a future social order. Indeed, virtually all of them described the goals of the
victorious opposition in terms of a "return to normality": the creation of a
parliamentary democracy with a "normal market economy" and a "normal Eu-
ropean" property order.
Moreover, most of the country's leading economists agreed that real reform
depended on the rapid privatization of the state sector. This consensus marked
a profound movement away from the "third road" ideas that many of these
same economists had implicitly or explicitly expressed in earlier years. Indeed,
the most aggressive architects of Poland's neoliberal transition strategy came
12. On the microeconomics of inflation during the 1980s and the emergence of the so-called
zatory platnicze (arrear backlogs), see Lipowski (1988) and Beksiak, Kawalec, and Malczewska
(1990). For the classic statement of the relationship between inflation and shortage in socialist
economies, see Kornai (1985).
13. Entry barriers for emigre-owned private businesses were lowered, and restrictions on the
handicraft sector loosened. Managers were allowed to use a 1935 commercial code that had never
been invalidated to form, nominally private, joint-stock companies out of state firms. And in 1988,
the Ministry of Finance decided to experimentally transform the property status of a few enter-
prises. See Rostowski (1989).
14. There is no full account of the extent and nature of this process. The best empirical material
can be found in the prosecutor general's report on the abuse of state property (Prokuratura Gener-
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from the same circles that had spearheaded the employee council movement
within Solidarity during the 1980s, particularly those associated with Siec.
1
5
This rejection of "market socialism" by those who had fought for the coun-
cils can only be understood in light of the history we have sketched. As we
have argued, in the 1940s and 1950s the councils were seen as a way to break
the Party's monopoly of political and economic power and thereby to make
possible more rational planning. In the early 1980s, the vision was extended,
and the promise of the councils became synonymous with the elimination of
both central planning and the Party's control of industrial life. Indeed, through-
out both periods, the political and economic motives for supporting the coun-
cils were so intertwined as to be inseparable.
During the 1980s, however, this linkage became unstuck. First, the Party
itself attempted to save the economy by legitimizing new property forms,
weakening the ideological constraints that had earlier bounded economic dis-
cussion. Second, the progressive collapse of the Party as a coherent institution
suggested at least to some that the councils were no longer particularly useful
battering rams against the system. And third, and perhaps most important, the
(partial) decentralization of the economy brought about by the reforms of 1981
seemed to have had frightening inflationary consequences. Indeed, the poor
performance of both the Polish and once "model" Yugoslav economies con-
vinced economists that the failure of Communism had less to do with the
single-party state than with the nature of socialized ownership itself: as long
as enterprises did not have owners interested in maximizing profits for personal
gain, the employees of state- or collectively owned firms would spend more on
wages and ill-considered investments than was rational.
Indeed, by the time the Communist party finally collapsed, ideas about
plant-based forms of worker representation had come full circle: if, over the
previous four decades, the arguments used to support councils had fused eco-
nomic and political rationales, then at the moment when the councils no longer
were useful as weapons in the struggle against the Party, reform economists
not only jettisoned their previous economic arguments but stood them on their
heads. Now, not only was privatization necessary, but virtually all forms of
worker influence on firm behavior came to be considered obstacles on the road
to "normality." It is within the context of this profound suspicion of all forms
of worker control that Poland's neoliberal reform strategy must be understood.
This strategy presented the transition to a market economy as a sequential
process composed of three elements; stabilization, privatization, and industrial
15. The list of former self-management advocates in the ministries is long. To name a few:
Leszek Balcerowicz, Marek Dabrowski, and Stefan Kawalec at the Ministry of Finance; Janusz
Lewandowski, Tomasz Gruszecki, Tomasz Stankiewicz, and Jan Szomburg at the Ministry of
Ownership Change. Most see their earlier advocacy of self-management simply as the best politi-
cal and economic compromise available to them under "really existing socialism." Other advocates
of self-management have remained more true to the idea of workers' control. They have also been
among the most active critics of their former allies.297 Poland: Councils under Communism and Neoliberalism
restructuring.
1
6 Stabilization was to free prices, radically tighten fiscal and
monetary policy, and open the country to new private businesses and foreign
goods. Taken together these measures were to introduce demand barriers into
the economy, forcing state firms to reduce costs, change production profiles,
and find new markets. Stabilization, however, was to be followed rapidly by
privatization because reformers believed that without private owners empow-
ered to choose investments and profits over wages, the spending patterns of
state enterprises would continually threaten macroeconomic equilibrium.
1
7 By
extension, reformers argued that it was a mistake to attempt to restructure state
enterprises before privatization since this amounted to little more than throw-
ing good money after bad. Thus, on the one hand, reformers planned to expose
state firms to precisely the market forces that they assumed would eventually
overwhelm them. On the other hand, they saw little point in trying to help state
firms adjust to those forces so long as they remained socialized entities. In-
deed, the entire reform strategy conceived of state firms in general and worker-
run firms in particular as something of an enemy, an enemy that had to be first
outflanked by the development of the private sector and then rapidly conquered
through privatization.
After two years in operation this strategy is now (in mid-1992) encountering
increasing difficulties (Schaffer 1992b; Blanchard and Berg 1992; Dabrowski,
Federowicz, and Levitas 1991a). The growth of the private sector, while dy-
namic, has been insufficient to absorb the losses sustained by the state sector.
Output remains about 20 percent lower than in December 1989, while unem-
ployment has climbed to above 12 percent of the active labor force (Johnson
1992; Coricelli and Revenga 1992; Freeman 1992). The fall in both production
and employment has occurred without a significant number of bankruptcies,
despite the fact that close to half of all state firms are now operating near or in
the red. Inflation remains high, and centrally imposed wage controls are break-
ing down. Moreover, declining tax revenues and increased social insurance
costs have left the state facing a profound fiscal crisis (Schaffer 1992a). Finally,
the government's ultimate weapon of reform privatization has yet to be success-
fully wielded in battle (Dabrowski et al. 1992; Berg 1992; Levitas 1992).
Despite the country's increasing economic problems, reformers continue to
defend the overall soundness of their basic strategy. Indeed, they claim that the
collapse of the state sector only demonstrates the fundamental weakness of
16. See Council of Ministers (1990). The plan broadly paralleled and was clearly influenced
by the ideas of Jeffery Sachs. Nonetheless, the domestic origins of the strategy should not be
underestimated. See Sachs (1989) and Sachs and Lipton (1990).
17. Some participants in the debate, however, were so pessimistic about the adjustment capacit-
ies of state firms that they argued that privatization should precede stabilization. For an extremely
cogent statement of this position, see Hinds (1990a, 1990b). Hinds recognizes the autonomy that
the "self-managed firms" have acquired and proposes a combination of massive, rapid privatization
prior to stabilization, and reassertion of state control over the rest of the sector during stabilization.
He does not, however, fully recognize the degree to which Polish firms had acquired control over
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socialized property and underscores the need for rapid privatization. In the
following, we argue on the contrary that the government's extremely pessimis-
tic assessment of the adjustment capacities of state firms in general, and of
council-run firms in particular, has been something of a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. In fact, the government's adversarial conception of the state sector and its
frontal attack on the councils have not only been costly but have undermined
one of the few social and economic institutions that might provide a workable
bridge between the past and some unknown, but more viable future.
We make this argument at four different levels. First, we argue that the ad-
justment patterns of council-run firms have been both extremely varied and
generally rational. Second, we point out that the government's assumption that
all council-run firms were structurally flawed, and therefore not worth helping,
meant that the state could neither see nor act on the differences between them.
As a consequence, the economy as a whole lost the potential growth of at least
some state firms. Third, we argue that many of the weaknesses of council-run
firms lie beyond their governance structures and that contrary to expectations
strengthening management by eliminating the councils has not improved firm
performance. In fact, it may actually worsen it. And finally, we show how the
state's hostility toward the councils has hampered privatization itself and that
privatization in general has succeeded only where the councils have been al-
lowed to lead the process. To make our case it is necessary to look more closely
at the structure and functioning of council-run firms during 1989-91.
1
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With the relegalization of Solidarity in April 1989, factory committees of
the union reemerged in the vast majority of industrial enterprises. Unlike in
1980, however, workers did not return en masse to Solidarity. Nor did they
completely abandon the official trade unions revived in 1983. Instead, in a
typical firm, 20 to 35 percent of workers rejoined Solidarity, while another 20
to 35 percent remained in the Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazkow Zawo-
dowych (OPZZ).
1
9 In some firms, the relegalized factory committees of Soli-
darity immediately forced the election of new employee councils. In most
firms, however, the election of new councils took place in May 1990 with the
18. In the following we rely primarily on a series of empirical studies conducted by the Gdansk
Institute of Market Economics since January 1990. Unless otherwise indicated, the information
contained in the following is based on the quantitative and qualitative study of 50 state manufac-
turing enterprises. Interviews were repeated quarterly and conducted individually with managers,
unionists, and employee council members. Respondents are asked about firm finances, wage and
employment policy, production and sales, industrial relations, privatization, and future prospects.
Statistical information bearing on these subjects was obtained. The enterprises are located in 10
different voviodships. Nineteen firms operate in large industrial centers of more than 500,000
inhabitants, 10 in cities of 100,000-500,000, and 21 in towns of less than 100,000. The sample
population is not statistically representative. Dabrowski, Federowicz, and Levitas (1991a, 1991b,
1991c).
19. In both cases, real union membership is hard to establish because the payment of dues is
highly irregular. OPZZ membership rates are inflated by large numbers of pensioners who remain
in the union to gain access to various social assets. Since 1990, union density has probably de-
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normal expiration of statutory terms of office. In virtually all firms, the newly
elected councils attempted to assert their legal rights over the disposition of
firm assets, lest managers steal them in the chaos of the transition.
Not surprisingly, the councils frequently moved to fire managing directors.
By the end of 1990, approximately 30 percent of all managing directors were
new, and by the end of 1991 some 40 percent were.
2
0 Contrary to reformers'
expectations, however, organized labor did not blindly strike out at managers
for their past political allegiances or for the immediate hardships caused by
stabilization. Indeed, during the first and most painful months of reform, sur-
prisingly few industrial conflicts were over wage issues. Instead, they centered
on managerial capacities to adjust to the new environment: ironically, manag-
ers were often fired for failing to reduce employment and to streamline the
operation of their firms fast enough.
Moreover, managerial change and the extension of council power in general
facilitated rather than blocked enterprise adjustment. Deep organizational re-
form was almost always associated with the appointment of new managing
directors. New managers were more able than old ones to make changes in the
operation of their firms.
2
1 Overall, about a third of the firms we examined made
comprehensive efforts to reform their sales, employment, financial, and pro-
duction structures, while the adjustment patterns of the rest could be classified
as shallow. Where reform was limited, failure was generally the product of
passivity on the part of both management and labor, and not the result of open
warfare. Where reform was actively blocked by one side or the other, manage-
ment was as often responsible as the councils or the unions.
While Solidarity members tend to dominate the councils, the councils are
not simple extensions of the union. Disagreement between the councils and
Solidarity over managerial selection and firm policy is common.
2
2 In 1990,
some councils were more "workerist" than their local unions, while others sup-
ported radical restructuring plans against more traditional union policies. In
1991, the tendency seems to be that the councils are more interested in firm
survival while the unions are more interested in wages and employment. This
is the result, in part, of the increasingly white-collar nature of the councils and,
in part, of rank-and-file pressures on the union to adopt more militant posi-
tions.
Despite hostility between the unions at the national level, locally they tend
to work together, presenting common positions to management on most issues.
Solidarity is the more influential union and even when in the minority is taken
more seriously by management. Solidarity is also more aggressive both in pur-
20. While exact data is lacking, most of these new managers probably were employed earlier in
the firms they now run.
21. This, however, was not always the case, and more than 25 percent of newly elected managers
initiated only limited reforms.
22. In a few firms, councils that were expected to vote out managers did not do so after examin-
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suing enterprise reform and in blocking it. In contrast, the OPZZ—despite its
radical rhetoric at the national level—seems to adapt itself to the policies of
the dominant local force. As the economic situation has deteriorated, both
unions have found themselves chasing wildcat strikes.
In small and medium-sized firms, unions and the councils frequently com-
pete with each other over firm policy. In general, competition has facilitated
adjustment by making one or another group more inclined to take a long-term
perspective on firm survival. In a few cases, organizational competition has
generated leapfrogging wage and employment demands. But this seems to be
exceptional. In most firms, there are enough actors aware of the need for struc-
tural reform to insure that management has at least some allies for change. In
small and medium-sized firms, more than half of the "deep" or "significant"
reforms were made before the onset of financial problems, indicating a capac-
ity for strategic foresight. In all these cases, cooperation between management
and labor was critical.
In large enterprises, the often daunting social consequences of radical re-
form have inclined both organized labor and management toward caution, if
not passivity. In these enterprises, both sides are often painfully aware that even
the most dramatic cutbacks will do little to ensure firm survival without the
arrival of new resources. Not surprisingly, comprehensive reform in large firms
was rare and, in general, began only after financial reserves had been ex-
hausted. In some highly visible, heavy-industrial firms, the unions have de-
manded the elimination of the councils and the renationalization of the firm.
Unable to win pay increases from the councils, or disturbed by the slow pace
of reform, unions felt they would do better negotiating directly with the gov-
ernment in a renationalized setting.
In sum, the overall picture of the adjustment efforts of council-run enter-
prises is mixed. On the one hand, approximately two-thirds of the firms we
examined made only limited attempts to adapt to the new environment. Every-
where people complained that decisions were taken too slowly and that too
much time was spent in meetings. Managers often claimed that their hands
were tied by incompetent councils or that they would be fired if they really
made radical changes. For their part, council members argued that managers
often lacked the skills necessary to save firms and that if it was possible to hire
better management they would have already done so. Council-run firms have
also become more willing over time to exceed centrally imposed wage norms
even as profits have declined.
On the other hand, at least one-third of all state enterprises made radical
changes in the way they do business. Councils and unions were either the lead-
ing forces of change or crucial partners to it. Moreover, the weakness of adjust-
ment efforts elsewhere has not been the result of open conflict between labor
and management, despite their mutual recriminations. Instead, passivity is
more often the product of confusion in the face of huge and very real structural
difficulties. The fact that most firms initially resisted raising wages when301 Poland: Councils under Communism and Neoliberalism
profits were high, and only began to overshoot wage norms when profits fell,
suggests that wage maximization is related to the bleakness of enterprise pros-
pects and not to squandering of development possibilities that wage restraint
might in theory facilitate.
2
3
Despite the generally rational reaction of council-run firms to the stabiliza-
tion program, and the efforts of many to adjust to the market, reformers con-
tinue to insist that firms are simply waiting for the financial discipline of the
state to break down and for the era of easy money to return. Thus, the govern-
ment has declined to aid state firms in restructuring their operations prior to
privatization, and substantial amounts of international funds earmarked for in-
dustrial restructuring are being held back until firms are privatized.
More important, the government's hope that stabilization and open markets
would force bad firms into bankruptcy while allowing good firms to get loans
from commercial banks has proved painfully naive. The number of bankrupt-
cies has been small, and banks continue to lend to marginal enterprises. Capital
has not been redirected to dynamic firms, and new investment loans have virtu-
ally stopped. Worse, firms that are making dramatic adjustment efforts are of-
ten refused credit while the loss-making enterprises around them still get it.
The paralysis of the banking system is not simply the product of incompe-
tence. State bank portfolios are swamped with the bad debts of a relatively
small number of huge industrial loss-makers (Boguszewski et al. 1993). Given
the banks' undercapitalization, foreclosing on these firms would essentially
mean bankrupting themselves. Moreover, even if they could afford to absorb
the losses, the banks are essentially being asked to bear the burdens of the
past lending patterns of the Communist state. Not surprisingly, they have been
reluctant to do so without assurances that the state will help absorb these costs
(Brainard 1991; Hinds 1990a, 59-64).
For its part, the state has been reluctant to get involved, insisting that the
market alone must determine the allocation of capital.
2
4 This reluctance to help
redirect capital to dynamic firms before privatization, and to engage in the
politically messy business of rewriting bad debts, has helped turn the state's
extremely pessimistic assessment of the socialized sector's adjustment capacit-
ies into a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the process, the economy has been de-
prived of the potential growth represented by well-run but capital-constrained
state firms.
The costs of the government's hostility to state firms in general, and council-
run ones in particular, are best exemplified by the practice of privatization to
date. As we have noted, by the early 1980s the councils had acquired the legal
right to control decisions about the disposition, transfer, or sale of firm assets.
23. It should be added that the share of wages in firms' overall costs is relatively low (though
rising), making it unlikely in most firms that savings on wages would provide a real source of
investment capital.
24. Finally in 1993, the government began developing a plan to write off some of the bad debts
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Throughout the decade, these rights were both contested and constrained by
the Party, and most councils eventually lost their dynamic and independent
character. Nonetheless, as Communism finally collapsed, two forces pushed
the councils to exercise a fuller range of their managerial powers. First, the
struggle against the "propertization of the nomenklatura" and the disorganiza-
tion of the post-Communist state left the councils as the sole institution capable
of preventing managers from appropriating assets. And second, stabilization—
if it was to be achieved through market mechanisms—required firms, and by
extension councils, to be free to determine their contractual relations and to
set prices.
Post-Communist reformers, afraid of the consolidation of council power and
hoping to privatize state firms as quickly as possible, immediately announced
an ambitious plan to sell off state firms. To do so, the government argued, firms
had to be commercialized first. This procedure was to entail turning firms into
capitalized joint-stock companies of the Treasury. As joint-stock companies,
firms were to replace their councils with boards of directors to which manage-
ment would be responsible and on which the state would have the dominant
voice. In short, commercialization was renationalization by another name.
2
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The government intended to sell firms, once commercialized, on the open
market, in the belief that the only rational way to allocate property rights was
to let the market decide.
2
6 In early 1990, 20 "good" firms whose councils had
agreed to commercialization were selected for the public offering program.
The state quickly discovered, however, that even with the full cooperation of
employees, preparing firms for auction and setting opening stock prices was a
lengthy procedure that often involved restructuring the firm itself. Moreover,
the fall in disposable income that came with stabilization made it clear that
even if many firms could be prepared for sale, multiple offerings would push
stock prices "toward zero."
2
7 In fact, only 17 successful public issues were
25. In public, the Ministry of Finance argued that commercialization was simply a necessary
prerequisite for its ambitious program of public offerings. In private, it hoped that the power to
commercialize firms at will would give the state insurance against the presumably perverse behav-
ior of council-run firms. In return for giving up control of their enterprises, employees were prom-
ised the possibility of purchasing a maximum of 20 percent of stock at preferential prices, as long
as the sum total of preferences did not amount to more than a year's average wages. It is fair to say
that the government feared worker ownership about as much as it feared worker control. Not
surprisingly, the government did not propose that within privatized firms some more modest form
of plant-based worker representation replace the employee councils.
26. For the assumptions and activities of the Agency for Property Transformation, see Gruszecki
(1990) and Jasinski (1990). The government hoped that by offering the stock of good firms at low
prices the state could generate a cycle of self-reproducing investor confidence that would make
possible the rapid sell-off of the state sector.
27. The initial plans to sell off firms on the open market were formulated in an extremely
inflationary environment. Market sales not only had an air of normality about them but also
seemed to be a useful tool in fighting inflation. Stabilization devastated the political and economic
logic of these plans as ridiculously low stock prices would allow a very select and suspect group
to acquire state assets at bargain basement prices. See Kawalec (1989).303 Poland: Councils under Communism and Neoliberalism
carried out between January 1990 and June 1992 (Berg 1992; Gruszecki 1990;
Levitas 1992).
In the spring of 1990, as the problems with public offerings became palpa-
ble, the draft legislation on privatization was debated in Parliament. Council
activists opposed giving the government the right to commercialize firms at
will. Significantly, they were joined by others who, while not enamored of the
councils, argued that the slowness of public offerings meant that mass com-
mercialization would entail the recentralization of economic power. As the ten-
uous boundary between the state and "its" firms dissolved, the state would
once again be responsible for running the entire economy.
2
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Not surprisingly, the idea of giving away state assets became more attractive.
Giveaways seemed to lessen the constraints imposed on privatization by shal-
low markets and hard-to-establish stock values, while taking the ownership
question out of an arena in which only firms and ministries had something at
stake. Stocks would be given to citizens, regardless of their workplaces,
through intermediary institutions.
2
9 As with commercialization, however, the
basic question of whether the councils could refuse to participate in the govern-
ment's privatization plans remained.
In the end, the privatization legislation passed by Parliament in July 1990
was a curious document. The Ministry for Ownership Change was given wide
powers to sell commercialized firms. The councils, however, were basically
given the right to veto state privatization plans.
3
0 Mass stock distribution
schemes were recognized as a possible instrument in the privatization process,
but no specific plan was identified. Almost as an afterthought, a paragraph was
added that made it possible for councils, with the approval of the Ministry, to
legally dissolve their firms and rent, lease, or sell their assets to a new corpora-
tion. Significantly, this new corporation could be solely or partly owned by its
employees, essentially providing a loophole for employee ownership.
In December 1991, an advocate of stock distribution schemes was made
minister of ownership change, and the focus of the privatization program
shifted from public offerings to mass privatization. The ministry began to iden-
tify 500 large and medium-sized firms that it wanted to include in the first
round of the program, and to design the mutual funds whose shares would be
given to the public. But if reformers had earlier found that they could not sim-
ply use the market to allocate property rights, they now found that the very
28. As the director of commercialized firms at the Ministry of Ownership Change later told
us, mass commercialization would "have made me a second Hillary Mine," the economic tsar of
Polish Stalinism.
29. In 1988, Lewandowski and Szomburg proposed using a voucher scheme to privatize state
assets in Poland. See Lewandowski and Szomburg (1989, 1990). Jeffery Sachs's proposal to com-
bine vouchers with mutual funds came later. See Sachs (1990).
30. In theory, their veto powers could be overturned by a majority vote of the Council of Minis-
ters with the approval of the prime minister, but these powers have yet to be used.304 Michal Federowicz and Anthony Levitas
construction of giveaway schemes involved making all sorts of judgments
about what kinds of markets each particular scheme would create. As the de-
tails of the operation grew hazier, firms declined to participate, while the min-
istry itself scaled down its ambitions.
What the ministry was able to accomplish was to convince—for one reason
or another—about 250 firms to become joint-stock companies of the Treasury
by the end of 1991.
3
1 Elimination of the councils and strengthening manage-
ment was hoped would improve these firms' performance. Contrary to expec-
tations, however, this has not happened. In fact, the adjustment capacities of
commercialized firms may actually have deteriorated.
3
2 In some firms this
seems to be related to the motives that lay behind the decision to commercial-
ize in the first place. Both managers and councils seem to have regarded com-
mercialization as a new way of "hooking onto the plan," expecting that after
renationalization they would receive special treatment from the state. Manag-
ers, instead of using their new autonomy to pursue reform, generally remained
passive, arguing that the unrest produced by change could scare away buyers or
that change itself was pointless until the desires of future owners were known.
Meanwhile, the newly created boards of directors have neither the authority
nor the information to force managers to alter their behavior.
In other firms, managers and councils agreed to commercialization because
they were already negotiating with potential buyers. For them commercializa-
tion was a necessary legal step toward privatization. At the moment when own-
ership rights reverted to the state, however, these firms lost control over the
choice of buyer and the terms of the sale. Suspicious of sweetheart deals, afraid
of sanctioning corruption, and looking to maximize revenues, the ministry al-
most inevitably tried to involve other parties in the sale. Sometimes earlier
negotiations stalled or collapsed, and sometimes the ministry choose buyers
that the firms opposed. In a few cases, these choices were clearly ill advised.
Finally, in some firms where adjustment efforts had begun, reform ceased after
commercialization as both workers and managers waited for ministerial direc-
tives. Moreover, industrial relations tended to deteriorate after the normal line
of communication between workers and managers—the councils—had been
eliminated.
Of all the government's programs to privatize state firms, it is the one that
has been least talked about and least invested in organizationally that has
proved to be the most successful: the so-called liquidation procedures. Not to
be confused with bankruptcy, the procedure allows for the legal dissolution of
an enterprise and the lease or sale of all or part of its assets to a new corporation
31. Some firms commercialized expecting to be included in mass privatization. A handful came
from the original pool of firms that were to be sold in public offerings. And most were hoping to
be bought out by foreign firms in trade sales.
32. The following discussion of commercialization and liquidated state enterprises is based on
our own study of 20 privatizing state enterprises. See Dabrowski et al. (1992) and Chelminski and
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created by the existing workforce. So far, more than 1,000 firms have been
"privatized" in this way. Despite the fact that most of them were small or
medium-sized enterprises, the numbers are impressive given the failure of both
public offerings and mass privatization and the fact that little has been done
politically or organizationally to promote liquidation.
3
3
To begin a liquidation procedure, a firm must have a ministerially recog-
nized consulting firm determine the value of its assets according to three differ-
ent accounting procedures. At a general meeting of the workforce, it is then
determined whether employees are willing to buy at least 20 percent of the
book value of the assets. If so, the firm enters into negotiations with the minis-
try over whether the book value of the assets will be used to determine the
value of the firm or whether another price will be set. Firms may also solicit
stock commitments from interested outside buyers. Depending on the price
that is ultimately arrived at, the willingness of employees to buy shares, and
the level of outside commitments, the assets of the enterprise can be purchased
outright, rented, or, most frequently, leased for 10 years, after which the for-
merly state-owned assets become fully privatized. As with the price of the
assets, the terms of the lease are the product of intense negotiations, and the
ministry can refuse to allow privatization to go forward if it wants to. On aver-
age, these procedures take about nine months to a year to complete.
Despite the fact that these privatizations, like all others, legally require the
dissolution of the employee councils, councils generally not only agree to them
but frequently lead them. Whether the initiative to liquidate a firm came from
management or labor, councils virtually always played the principal role in
explaining the process to the workforce and a major role in negotiating with
consulting firms, provincial authorities, and the ministry. Moreover, unlike in
all other privatizations, there is a clear link to efforts to change the structure
and functioning of firms before and after the actual legal transformation of the
enterprise itself as adjustment efforts begin before privatization and continue
after it is completed.
In most firms privatized through liquidation procedures, blue-collar workers
purchase 20 to 30 percent of shares. Nonetheless, what is striking about the
capital structure of many of these new corporations is the plurality of major
shareholders. Typically, the largest group of owners is drawn from white-collar
workers, and frequently the managing director is the largest single shareholder.
Also, and contrary to expectations, insiders frequently find outside individuals
to buy into the firm. Usually these investors come from the network of the
firm's suppliers and buyers. Sometimes they acquire a controlling interest.
Most frequently, however, they are significant but not dominant shareholders,
and generally stocks are more or less evenly divided between managers, work-
ers, and outside investors.
33. Another 534, mostly small, firms have been bankrupted and had their assets sold off by re-
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Despite the constant accusations of reformers that the councils block priva-
tization, most privatizations are in fact being nursed into the world by them.
Moreover, worker-management buyouts do not seem to be creating the immo-
bile capital structures that the government feared. Perhaps most important,
firm-led property transformations have not only proceeded faster than public
auctions and mass privatization but seem to link legal changes in ownership
with economic restructuring of the enterprise itself. If the failure of public
offerings demonstrates that the market alone cannot be used to allocate prop-
erty rights, and if the failure of mass privatization demonstrates that the alloca-
tion of property rights cannot be used to create workable markets, the success
of liquidation procedures shows that the social reconstruction of property
rights and markets not only must be carried out together but is best led by
actors closest to the assets and markets at issue.
10.4 The Future of Workplace-Based Representation in Poland
The history of Polish councils can only be understood within a larger com-
parative context that begins with the widespread application of Taylorist prin-
ciples of industrial organization in the years just before the First World War.
Almost everywhere the adoption of mass production technologies generated
resistance on the shop floor and helped spawn movements for the direct control
of production by the workforce. And almost everywhere these movements at
once sharpened the struggle between labor and capital and helped further frac-
ture the Left between the reformism of the Second International, the etatism
of the Third, and the "Utopian" socialism of anarchosyndicalism.
3
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In the West, the defeat of the revolutionary Left after the First World War,
and the victory of Fordist strategies of production, served to marginalize ideas
about workers' control until at least 1968. Tactically, the labor movement
seemed better served by organizational forms that linked workers across firms
and industries, while strategically, the productive powers of Fordism seemed
to legitimate a vision of industrial change that saw its endpoint not so much in
the abolition of the division of labor but in its planned regulation. Indeed, be-
tween 1945 and 1970 the social democratic combination of Keynesian macro-
economic policies and arm's-length industrial bargaining proved remarkably
successful in raising working-class living standards.
For all its success, however, the traditional modalities of social democratic
politics began to unravel in the mid-1970s when increasingly volatile interna-
tional markets turned the rigid organizational structures of Fordism into a com-
petitive liability (Piore and Sabel 1984). The attempt to regain flexibility at the
point of production has prompted capital to renew its struggle against union-
ism. At the same time, this attack has been accompanied by at least verbal
34. See chap. 1 in this volume by Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck. See also the extremely
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attempts to replace the adversarial and arm's-length industrial relations of the
past with some new, more cooperative modus vivendi.
In countries where the institutions of postwar social democracy never fully
crystallized—such as France and the United States—the very weakness of
organized labor has allowed capital to behave as if unilateral control over the
workplace was a sufficient condition for flexible competitiveness. Attempts to
institutionalize more cooperative industrial relations have oscillated between
voluntarism and defection, leaving capital's expressed desire for greater worker
participation rather hollow. In countries where organized labor remains rela-
tively strong—such as Sweden—or where this strength has been accompanied
by the legal and institutional preservation of plant-based forms of worker rep-
resentation—such as Germany—the effort to find a new, more cooperative
system of industrial relations has been more successful.
In Poland, however, not only were plant-based forms of worker representa-
tion more prominent throughout most of the postwar period, but ironically
their very strength in the past has become a liability for their future. As we
have argued, the fusion of Taylorism, central planning, nationalization, and
Party-controlled unionism served to transform works councils into one of the
principal institutional locations of a larger struggle between state and society.
Ideologically, this struggle pushed and pulled the opposition in general, and
the labor movement in particular, toward reinventing the anarchosyndicalist
vision of industrial organization that elsewhere had been in retreat since the
First World War. In practice, it accelerated the decomposition of both state
planning and state property, leaving in its wake a highly confused set of rela-
tions between economic actors and the industrial assets they inhabited.
The confused nature of these relations, combined with the poor performance
of the Polish economy during the 1980s, prompted not only a reappraisal of
"market socialism" but also the complete rejection of all ideas that linked posi-
tive economic outcomes with worker participation in management. Thus, para-
doxically, at precisely the moment when workplace-based forms of worker
representation are coming to be seen in the West as institutions necessary
for competitive success, they are being rejected in the East as legacies of the
past.
This rejection can be seen in virtually all aspects of the neoliberal reform
strategy adopted by Poland's post-Communist reformers. Not only was the
rapid privatization of state assets understood as the sine non qua of systemic
transformation, but the primary strategies of privatization were explicitly de-
signed to eliminate worker influence over the process itself. Moreover, and not
surprisingly, there has been no effort to mandate legally a role for workplace-
based forms of worker participation either in the emerging private sector or in
privatized state enterprises. Worse, while in general working reasonably well
with the councils at the local level, the unions have not sought to defend them
at the national level. In part, this is because councils are seen as institutional
competitors. More important, however, it reflects the unions' belief that they308 Michal Federowicz and Anthony Levitas
cannot survive politically being party to unpopular restructuring plans when
living standards are falling.
Nonetheless, the difficulties that Poland's neoliberal strategy is encountering
may ultimately serve to modify the current hostility to plant-based forms of
worker representation. As we have argued, the only privatization strategy that
has worked to date has been critically dependent on the active support and
participation of the employee councils. Despite the fact that the councils stand
to lose their legal standing after privatization, there are indications that in many
liquidated enterprises former council members are being named to the newly
created boards of directors, irrespective of the structure of stock ownership.
This suggests that at least in the short term, and in firms that have succeeded
in transforming their legal and economic identities on their own, new and old
owners have come to recognize the value of plant-based worker representation.
Moreover, the government is increasingly coming to realize that privatiza-
tion cannot be carried out without the prior or simultaneous restructuring of
enterprises. As a result, state actors are beginning to search for local allies in
the reform process, trying actively to involve not just management but labor in
the discussion of the future of plants, regions, and industries. Increasingly, the
massive problems presented by industrial restructuring are forcing the state to
look for more cooperative relations with labor, in the same way that market
volatility in the West has forced capital to at least partly rethink worker partici-
pation.
The informal reproduction of workplace-based forms of worker representa-
tion in newly privatized firms and the state's recent attempts to involve the
councils in industrial restructuring continue to take place against the back-
ground of the reformers' general hostility to worker participation in manage-
ment and the unions' desire for a "pure and simple" industrial identity. This
makes it unlikely that the existing informal structures of worker participation
can survive, let alone prosper, without a stronger legal foundation. When nego-
tiations stall, it is all too tempting for both labor and capital (read for the mo-
ment: the state) to blame each other for the failure and to defect from future
efforts at co-determination. On the other hand, few in Poland have fully real-
ized the degree to which market volatility renders arm's-length industrial rela-
tions a competitive liability. Without some state regulations that force labor
and capital into permanent negotiations at the plant level, Poland is in danger
of replacing the existing institutional foundations for such negotiations with a
model of industrial organization that has already lost its competitive edge.
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